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TEXAS CHEERLEADERS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
CAN YOU CHEER FOR GOD AT A FOOTBALL GAME?
Brett A. Geier*
I. INTRODUCTION-RELIGIOUS DOXOLOGY TAKES CENTER STAGE
The United States was founded upon Christian ideals; yet it was be-
cause of the variations of that faith that our Nation's forefathers sought to
evade persecution and begin anew in the Americas. While the message "In
God We Trust" became the doxology of the governmental infrastructure
for the United States, the framers of the Constitution held religious liber-
ties in high regard. The framers ensured that religious persecution exhib-
ited by their European fathers would not be repeated. The framers' intent
was to instill the premise that belief in God was critical to establishing a
benevolent society, yet receptive to multiple practices of worship, including
religions other than Christianity. Citizens of the United States would not
succumb to religious persecution, as their ancestors; the state must refrain
from establishing any religion.
Free speech and religious expression are foundational concepts that
were critical in the formation of the United States Constitution and the
history of the Nation. Citizens strive to maintain these liberties and vigi-
lantly seek to protect them. The First Amendment includes language re-
garding the role the framers thought public entities should have in
establishing religion or denying its expression. In concert with various free
speech fora, public expression of religious ideals can cause consternation
between entities that are pontificating a non-secular message and those
charged with ensuring the government does not breach the intent of the
Establishment Clause. With a short search of Free Exercise or Establish-
ment Clause contests in United States' jurisprudence, it can be noted that a
plethora of cases have been argued and adjudicated. The amount of litiga-
tion contested in state and national courts provides the conclusion that
while the First Amendment protects these ideals, ambiguity continues as to
their pragmatic implementation. The conflicts arising out of these contests
are volatile due to the emotions conjured with religious faith and the duty
to ensure government organs are not favoring, nor inhibiting, one religion
over another.
First Amendment challenges encompassing religious establishment or
protection of non-secular viewpoints often require a detailed deconstruc-
tion of the facts surrounding the points of contention as the arguments are
complex. While Thomas Jefferson's proverbial "wall" separating church
and state purports an unambiguous and stationary barrier, litigious contests
continue to permeate the public school landscape. Proponents of the
* Dr. Brett A. Geier is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Educational Leadership
and Policy Studies at the University of South Florida-Tampa.
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"wall" are fearful of those whose self-proclaimed mission it is to "save the
souls of the lost" and view the school setting as an opportune stage to es-
pouse such tenets. Likewise, affording individuals the right to freely articu-
late his or her religious beliefs in a public setting is fundamental to
American constitutional entitlements.
Due to the varying religious culture throughout the Nation, communi-
ties often debate the emphasis religion should entail in one of the most
public spheres of influence available, the local public school. As will be
noted in this thesis, ambivalent theories regarding religious indoctrination
pervade local communities. Courts, especially at the lower level, have been
inclined to deviate from postulates previously contrived to address these
religious challenges. Because of societal norms and mores, some courts are
cavalier in their desire to move away from the theory of stare decisis et
quieta non movere (to stand by things decided and not disturb settled
points) and establish a return to early American judicial interpretation of
religion in public schools.
The lens of permitting religious activities under the guise of free
speech doctrine is reflected in the case of cheerleaders at Kountze High
School placing religious messages on run-through banners during pre-game
ceremonies at football games. The plaintiffs contend that they are employ-
ing their private free speech protections under the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment. They argue that because they have taken a vote
among themselves to approve the messages placed on the banner, a limited
public forum has been established, which divorces the school administra-
tors from the activity, thus relieving them from violating the Establishment
Clause. The position the cheerleaders have taken and approbated by the
District Court is in error and is an attempt to circumvent prior case law to
posture for protection of religious activities under free speech doctrine.
II. A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF RELIGION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Following the Nation's inception, courts were quite tolerant of relig-
ious practices in the public sphere. Up until circa 1940, the government
actually encouraged piety through acts such as Bible readings in school,
frequent invocations of God, and physical representations of the Ten Com-
mandments on public buildings.' A patriotic metanoia commenced in the
1930s illustrated by the fact that many schools throughout the United
States required their students to stand, salute and pledge allegiance to the
American flag before school each morning.2 Many Jehovah's Witnesses
became irate with this practice, claiming that it violated the commandment,
"You shall have no other gods before me."3 Jehovah Witness students who
complied with the sectarian diktat were suspended and expelled from
school for insubordination.4 As World War II commenced across Europe
1. NATHAN L. ESSEX, SCHOOL LAW AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 15 (5th ed. 2012).
2. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 592 (1940).
3. Exodus 20:3 (New International Version).
4. Minersville Sch. Dist., 310 U.S. at 592.
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and Asia, patriotic fervor increased throughout the United States, which
left little tolerance for the Jehovah's Witness's perceived lack of nationalis-
tic support.5 As the realization that the United States was set to become a
primary participant in the war, intolerance for the Jehovah's Witness's posi-
tion increased and in some situations became violent.6 Seeing no other
recourse, the Jehovah's Witness denomination turned to the Supreme
Court for shielding in a case that saw three children of the Gobitis family
expelled from school when they refused to participate in the Pledge of Al-
legiance.7 The family claimed that the Free Exercise Clause protected their
religious objections to the ceremony.8
The Supreme Court validated the school district's position, believing
that rituals designed to "secur[e] effective loyalty to the traditional ideals
of democracy" 9 were crucial. In contrast to the normal d6marche of the
Supreme Court, three years later, it examined the issue again.' ° Three new
justices and increasing violence toward the Jehovah's Witnesses gave cause
for the Court to reconsider the Minersville School District v. Gobitis deci-
sion.11 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette reversed Miners-
ville School District, concluding that an individual does not have to say
what he or she does not believe. 2 The Court postulated that freedom of
religion and speech are of a higher priority than national security interests,
thus children of Jehovah's Witnesses could not be required to participate in
the Pledge of Allegiance.' 3
In 1944, the Supreme Court fortified its posture by deciding a case
regarding the ability of the government to decide the merits of any relig-
ion. 4 Guy Ballard was the leader of a religious movement entitled the "I
Am Movement."'" Ballard contended that he had personal encounters
with Jesus and Saint Germain and was able to heal individuals outside of
5. RONALD B. FLOWERS, THAT GODLESS COURT? SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON CHURCH-
STATE RELATIONSHIPS 27 (2d ed. 2005).
6. Id.
7. See Minersville Sch. Dist., 310 U.S. at 592.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 598; see also FLOWERS, supra note 5, at 27 (Justice Felix Frankfurter's majority opinion
declared that a national interest of the highest importance was at stake; the nation needed loyalty and
unity of people and a flag salute is a primary way of achieving it. Justice Frankfurter went further to say,
"[n]ational unity is the basis of national security .... The ultimate foundation of a free society is the
binding tie of cohesive sentiment .... 'We live by symbols.' The flag is the symbol of our national
unity, transcending all internal differences, however large, within the framework of the Constitution.").
10. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 640-42 (Mindful of the fascist wave that was overtaking Europe, the Court was very
cognizant of the state's intrusion into various liberties. Justice Robert Jackson eloquently identified the
scope of liberties Americans enjoy by writing, "[b]ut freedom to differ is not limited to things that do
not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to
differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order. If there is any fixed star in our constitu-
tional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.").
14. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 81 (1944).
15. Id.
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normal medical practice.' 6 Based upon his self-proclaimed religious skills,
he enticed people to send money in support of his mission.17 The govern-
ment conceived a theory that Ballard was defrauding those that were finan-
cially supporting him by claiming a falsity in his religion. 8 Thus, the query
was, "does a civil court or the government have the right to evaluate the
religious beliefs of a person or a group?"' 9 The Court concluded that in-
deed the government did not have the right to evaluate the religious valid-
ity of an individual or group.2 °
The trend of prohibiting government interference in the rights of indi-
viduals to espouse their religious philosophies in the public sphere re-
mained fairly intact for roughly the next two decades. Based upon a case
adjudicated in 1940,21 the Supreme Court established a framework by
which it would evaluate religious liberties. The theory of "clear and pre-
sent" danger would become the standard to the early 1960s.22 Clear and
present danger addressed the government's legal ability to chill individual
or group rights to religious pontification in public areas.23 In order for the
government to prohibit religious activities, it had to show the activity
presented an immediate threat to public safety, peace or order. 4 No
longer could the government prohibit religious activity based upon the pre-
mise that it presented "some" danger to society. The government had to
establish that the religious activity "presented a grave, significant, and cur-
rent danger" before it intervened.25 Ensuring individuals their right to es-
pouse religious tenets was of primary importance during this time.
In the early 1960s, the sentiment for accepting religion in public
schools began to alter. Judicially, the courts became less tolerant about al-
lowing religion in schools, choosing instead to strengthen the Establish-
ment Clause. Highlighting this period was the abeyance of requiring
students in public schools to recite daily prayers. In 1962, the parents of
ten students sued the New York schools challenging the constitutionality of
a state law requiring public schools to start each day with a state-authorized
prayer drafted by the State Board of Regents.2 6 Justice Hugo Black, writ-
ing for the majority, stated
[W]e think that the constitutional prohibition against laws
respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean
that in this country it is no part of the business of govern-




19. FLOWERS, supra note 5, at 29.
20. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 81-83.
21. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310-11 (1940).




26. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 423 (1962).
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American people to recite as part of a religious program
carried on by government.
Limiting state-sponsored prayer continued to permeate the Supreme
Court's docket as they negated a law in Pennsylvania, which required that
at least ten verses from the Holy Bible be read without comment at the
beginning of each school day.28 During this period, it is apparent that
courts, in general, held more weight for the Establishment Clause than the
Free Exercise Clause. Ensuring the state did not become entangled within
private religious practices was more important than ensuring Free Exercise
rights were protected.
Various state legislatures and religious institutions sought to circum-
vent the chilling of prayer and Bible reading in public schools.29 Praying as
an individual was never in doubt, as long as it did not interrupt the regular
school activities.3 ° Monitoring individual worship would be near impossi-
ble to regulate, and it would violate the Free Exercise Clause, clashing with
the intentions of the framers of the Constitution. In 1985, the Supreme
Court adjudicated on this very notion.31 In 1978, the State of Alabama
passed a law that established a period of silent meditation in public schools,
which could be used for any type of reflection (secular or non-secular) by
the individual student.32 In 1981, the Alabama Legislature amended the
act to include the phrase, "or voluntary prayer."33 The Court held that the
only logical conclusion for including this phrase was to encourage students
to pray.34 Many states currently have laws authorizing a moment of silence
for prayer or meditation in public schools, which may withstand scrutiny
due to the sentiment that there is not a legislative intent to impose
prayer.35 These situations will continue to be reviewed on a case-by-case
basis.
Understanding the cultural background and judicial history of the con-
tention between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause is
crucial to interpreting the facts and overall meaning of the Kountze case.
27. Id. at 425.
28. See School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (determining that schools
filled with children provide a captive audience for religious indoctrination and therefore would hold
contrary to constitutional intent; even if the schools provided for an opt-out provision, this would not
correct the constitutional defects).






35. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 1003.45(2) (2013) ("The district school board may provide that a brief
period, not to exceed 2 minutes, for the purpose of silent prayer or meditation be set aside at the start
of each school day or each school week in the public schools in the district"); see also Brown v. Gil-
more, 258 F.3d 265, 270, 276 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that a Virginia silent prayer statute authorizing a
"daily observance of one minute of silence" in all classrooms so that pupils may "'meditate, pray, or
engage in other silent activity" was neutral toward religion).
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The introduction of this thesis is intended to define the history of the Na-
tion's judicial interpretation of religious celebration in public schools. The
post-war period solidified the notion that those representing state organs,
especially public schools, should employ caution. Keeping state-sponsored
religion separate from public schools was an important tenet of the Court.
The individual liberties associated with practicing religion at school were
notably protected, yet restrictions were placed upon the school as to its
allowance to encourage religious moments.
III. BACKGROUND-CHEERLEADERS ROOT FOR GOD
In September 2012, Kountze, Texas became a platform for a First
Amendment challenge alleging a public school chilled the rights of student
athletes to exercise their individual and collective constitutional guarantee
under the Free Exercise Clause to practice a specific religion.36 Cheer-
leaders often construct a "run-through sign," containing a sectarian mes-
sage of encouragement (i.e. Go Hawks! or Beat the Eagles!), which the
players advance through as they enter the competition arena. Run-through
signs are a traditional form of school spirit throughout the nation and are a
widely accepted practice of school spirit. The cheerleaders in Kountze,
Texas departed from the typical secular tradition of these messages to pro-
mote specific sectarian content including Biblical verses.37
The superintendent, concerned the school was violating the Establish-
ment Clause, requested a school administrator announce during school
hours that the cheerleaders would henceforth be prohibited from including
their religious messages on the run-through banners.38 The posture by the
school gave cause to the cheerleaders, represented by their parents, to ar-
gue the school was seeking to censor their speech in an unconstitutional
manner.39 Judge Steven Thomas of Hardin County granted a temporary
injunction for the cheerleaders on October 18, 2012 based on three primary
points: "1) A cause of action against the defendants exists; 2) Plaintiffs
have a probable right to the relief sought; and 3) Plaintiffs will suffer a
probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim."40 The court
noted that the "Plaintiffs have no other adequate remedy at law because no
amount of money can compensate them for the loss of their constitutional
and statutory rights."41 The court furthered the support for an immediate
injunction citing the rights of a plaintiff to receive a permanent injunction
for the perceived or real threat of injury.42 Therefore, the cheerleaders
were permitted to continue placing the religious messages on the run-
36. Order on Plaintiffs Application for Temporary Injunction at 4, Matthews v. Kountze Indep.






42. Id; see TEX. CirV. PRAC. & REM. § 106.002(a) (West 1985) ("[T]he person aggrieved by the
violation or threatened violation may sue for preventive relief, including a permanent or temporary
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throughs for the remainder of the football season with a ruling set for June
2013. 43
The plaintiffs' argument that the school had unconstitutionally pre-
vented them from displaying their religious message was couched in the
Free Exercise Clause, free speech doctrine, and equal protection of the
law.4' The plaintiff cheerleaders argued that their team was a non-curricu-
lar activity that did not intend to impart knowledge or skills on students;
instead it was a fun activity encouraging school spirit.45 The cheerleaders
practiced on their own time, but never during the school day.46 The Appli-
cation for Permanent Injunction went to great measure to establish a de-
tachment between the cheerleaders and the school in any official
capacity. 47 The cheerleaders managed themselves with a member of the
team leading the squad each week.48 Two faculty "sponsors" were present
at each practice in a non-participatory, custodial manner.49 The contention
described by the plaintiffs makes a concerted effort to eliminate the per-
ceived or real association that the school has any responsibility for this or-
ganization, thus making them exempt from administrators dampening their
free speech rights. All supplies required for the run-through banners were
purchased with private funds, again, attempting to disassociate the activity
from the auspice of the school.5" Because this non-secular gemeinschaft is
managed independently of the school, the plaintiffs argue they qualify to
use the facility in a manner consistent with a limited public forum.51
On May 8, 2013, the district court in Hardin County executed a sum-
mary judgment order that confirmed the original injunction allowing the
cheerleaders to place religious messages on the run-through banners.52
The order was succinct in declaring that the cheerleaders' action did not
create, nor would create, "an establishment of religion in the Kountze com-
munity."53 In addition, the court furthered the contention by claiming the
actions of the cheerleaders did not violate the Establishment Clause.54 The
Kountze decision fails to appropriately apply case law that has established
precedence in religious contests and is a thinly-veiled attempt to employ
judicial activism to perforate the separation of church and state.
55
injunction"); see also TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. § 110.005(a)(2) (West 1999) (a grievant may request
"injunctive relief to prevent the threatened violation or continued violation").
43. Order on Plaintiff's Application for Temporary Injunction at 4-22, Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist.,









52. Summary Judgment Order at 2, Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526 (Dist. Ct. Tex. May 8,
2013).
53. Id. at 1.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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The Kountze conundrum is a quality example of the permutations of
prior case law into the theory of religious activism in limited public fora
enjoying the protection of free speech. In order to appreciate the court's
acceptance of religion as speech, an acute examination of the claims by the
plaintiff is required.
The foundation of the complaint relies on the hypothesis that the relig-
ious messages placed on the banners do not include the school administra-
tion's endorsement of the act. The plaintiffs' intentional exclusion of the
administration's sanction permits them to claim their actions fall under free
speech protection, thus the district does not have the authority to chill their
rights to place religious messages on the banners. The plaintiffs' conclusion
neglects important precedential concepts and makes numerous
assumptions.
In their complaint, the cheerleaders broadly disassociate themselves
from the auspice of the school's jurisdiction in order to establish them-
selves as a sovereign community with access and protection afforded an
individual or group in a limited public forum. The plaintiffs enumerate
multiple reasons as to why they are not associated with the school: tryouts
judged by college cheerleaders, materials purchased by private donors, and
faculty sponsors that serve in a custodial capacity are justifications for in-
corporation into free speech protection.56 They contend that they have a
constitutional right to control the content of the banner and are liberated
from governmental control. 7
IV. PUBLIC FORA-THE STAGE FOR FREE SPEECH
The high school football field is the stage where this contest occurs, yet
first, it must be ascertained as to what type of forum a school-sponsored
football game constitutes. The cheerleaders contend they have engaged in
private speech because school officials were not associated with the selec-
tion of the team, nor has the school sanctioned the activity because the
cheerleaders held a team vote as to whether or not to display the religious
message.5 The school did not open its football field for expression by any
other students, especially at a school-sponsored activity.59 These facts re-
duce the ability to employ the argument that the school established a lim-
ited public forum at the football game permitting the cheerleaders to place
religious messages on their signs.
The Supreme Court recognized that there are various public fora
where freedom of speech may be exercised, and it established the "public
forum analysis."6 A limited public forum is established when the school
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Order on Plaintiff's Application for Temporary Injunction at 4-22, Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist.,
No. 53526 (Dist. Ct. Tex. Oct. 18, 2012).
59. Id.
60. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S. Ct. 948, 955
(1983) (holding that there are degrees of freedom of speech dependent upon the type of forum where
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opens its facilities for speech or expression outside of non-school hours.6"
"The school is not required to create this type of forum, but once created, it
is subject to the same regulations as a traditional public forum, and any
restraint on speech must pass a strict scrutiny analysis. '6 2 A limited public
forum exists if: "(1) there is a governmental interest in creating such a fo-
rum, or (2) outsiders seek access to the school and there is evidence that
wide access has been granted before. '6 3 If the school allows access to its
facilities by non-curricular communities, it must conform to the non-dis-
crimination model.64
Should the school establish a limited public forum, it must comply with
the Equal Access Act (EAA).65 For any secondary school that receives
federal funds and has established a limited public forum, the school must
ensure a fair opportunity for all student groups to meet in the forum with-
out regard to "the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the
speech at such meetings. '66 A secondary school that has created a limited
public forum must allow groups to meet, as long as:
" The meeting is voluntary and student-initiated;
" Teachers or other school employees do not sponsor the group;
* School employees do not promote, lead or participate in a meeting;
" School employees are present at religious meetings only in a super-
visory or non-participator capacity;
* The meeting does not materially and substantially interfere with
the orderly conduct of educational activities within the school.67
Non-school persons may not direct, conduct, control, or regularly at-
tend activities of student groups.68 Schools may reject an application for a
group to use school facilities if those activities cause "material[ ] and sub-
stantial[ ] interfere[nce] with the orderly conduct of educational activities
within the school .... "69 Schools may decline to provide equal access only
the speech was delivered; three major categories were defined: traditional public forum, limited public
forum and non-public forum).
61. Id.
62. KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 431 (8th ed.
2012).
63. Id.
64. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993) (hold-
ing that where a public school grants access to its facilities during non-school hours to secular organiza-
tions, it could not prohibit access to religious organizations simply because of the religious content of
the activities to be engaged in by those organizations); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (a university's refusal to fund a student publication because the publi-
cation addressed issues from a religious perspective violated the Free Speech Clause); see also Good
News Club v. Milford Centr. Schools, 533 U.S. 98, 119-20 (2001) (finding that when the state establishes
a limited public forum allowing community use of school facilities after school, the state may not dis-
criminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint and, accordingly, excluding a private Christian or-
ganization from use of facilities for meetings where children were taught moral lessons from a Christian
perspective through live storytelling and prayer violated the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment).
65. 20 U.S.C.S. § 4071(a) (LexisNexis 2014).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. DAVID L. STADER, LAW AND ETHICS IN EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 43 (2d ed. 2013).
69. 20 U.S.C.S. § 4071(c)(4) (LexisNexis 2014).
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where there would be a clear and significant inference of endorsement.7 °
While several points of this description reinforce the cheerleader's claim, a
primary component that is absent is the capturing of an audience that may
object to their religious views. The Ninth Circuit held that a student may
not lead a school assembly in prayer in which attendance was voluntary.7'
V. FREE SPEECH PROTECTION FOR THE CHEERLEADERS
Football games are a quintessential traditional school-sponsored activ-
ity that many high schools throughout the nation conduct on a regular ba-
sis. Various activities occur at these games, which are open to members of
the student body. In fact, schools encourage participation by the students
and community with great regularity. Kountze High School did not pas-
sively open a public location (the football field) for multiple speakers to
express various messages. In contrast, the argument proffered by the
cheerleaders is that the school authorized a single group to decide (presum-
ably by a majority vote, yet not specified) what messages may be placed on
the banners on public property without any official school guidance,72
thereby enhancing the contention that the cheerleaders are, in fact, a pri-
vate group.
The act of placing religious messages on the banners raises serious Es-
tablishment Clause issues. High school football games are a quintessential
school-sponsored activity, and players running through the banners are
often a part of that activity to enhance school spirit. Therefore, it is reason-
able for any objective outside observer to conclude that the cheerleaders
and the banners they created bear the imprimatur of the school. Naturally,
the players and cheerleaders don uniforms that contain the school colors
and mascots. The Fourth Circuit Court noted that by its very nature, "[a]
school mascot or symbol bears the stamp of approval of the school itself,"
and to avoid affronting the students of the school in attendance at the game
is a legitimate concern. 73 A natural disconnect exists between the cheer-
leaders and the school, yet the plaintiffs are attempting a circuitous maneu-
ver around the notion that they are coupled with the school.
Freedom of speech is an extremely protected right in the United
States. Religious speech, couched in free speech doctrine, is notably pro-
tected as well. Students in the public schools do not "shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."
74
The Court went further to articulate the point that schools do not have a
70. Culbertson v. Oakridge Sch. Dist. No. 76, 258 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2001).
71. Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1981).
72. Vikram David Amar & Alan E. Brownstein, The Establishment Clause and the Free Speech
Clause in the Context of the Texas High School Cheerleader Religious Banner Dispute, JUSTIA.COM,
(Nov. 12, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/11/09/the-establishment-clause-and-the-free-speech-
clause-in-the-context-of-the-texas-high-school-cheerleader-religious-banner-dispute (last visited Mar.
28, 2014).
73. Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d. 801, 802 (4th Cir. 1988).
74. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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right to punish students for expressing their views on public school prem-
ises, irrelevant of the speech's location, unless the administration has rea-
son to believe such expression will interfere with the work of the
students.75 Clearly, a school need not tolerate student speech that is incon-
sistent with its mission. 76 School facilities may be deemed to be public fo-
rums, only if school authorities have, by policy or practice, opened those
facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public. In Walz ex rel. Walz
v. Egg Harbor Township Board of Education, a parent sued the district
claiming that a pre-kindergarten holiday party created a traditional public
forum when students were allowed to exchange gifts. 77 However, one stu-
dent was prohibited from exchanging gifts due to the fact that it contained
religious messages. 78 The football field at Kountze High School was decid-
edly being used for school-sponsored activities (football games) with the
school providing financial, organizational, and human support for the
event. The school did not intend for the pre-game ceremonies to become a
limited public forum. The plaintiffs have misapplied several of their points
to draw the conclusion that a limited public forum was established.
In 1988, the Supreme Court adjudicated a case relative to a school
district's authority to control student speech.79 Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier
settled a significant contest between administrators endorsing the mission
of the school through censorship and student journalism students claiming
a First Amendment violation. 0 The school administration failed to publish
two stories: the first story described three students' experience with preg-
nancy and the second "discussed the impact of divorce on students at the
school."'8 1 The principal charged with screening the articles duly noted that
even though the students who were pregnant were not identified in the
story, there was enough information provided that identification was prob-
able. 2 The principal was secondarily concerned that the references made
about "sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate" for the age of
students.83 The principal was concerned for the parents identified in the
story and conjectured that the appropriate thing to do was to offer the
parents identified an opportunity in the story to comment.84 "[T]he First
Amendment rights of students in the public schools 'are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings' and must be applied
in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. 81 5 "A
75. Id. at 508.
76. See Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 466 (6th Cir. 2000) (extending the
boundaries of Hazelwood to include a Marilyn Manson t-shirt that promoted values that were inconsis-
tent with the mission of the school; the school was permitted to ban the wearing of these t-shirts even
though there was no proof of disruption).
77. Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 342 F. 3d. 271, 274 (3d Cir. 2003).
78. Id.
79. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S 260, 262 (1988).
80. Id.




85. Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
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school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic
educational mission,' even though the government could not censor similar
speech outside the school ... "86 "[S]chool facilities may be deemed to be
public forums only if school authorities have 'by policy or by practice'
opened those facilities 'for indiscriminate use by the general public,' or by
some segment of the public.. .. 87 "[S]chool officials may impose reason-
able restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and other members of
the school community .... " if it runs anathema to the school's mission."8
A couple of points need to be analyzed in order to determine whether
the speech had the endorsement of the school. Following the Hazelwood
decision, free speech cases depended on the following issues: Did the
speech occur as part of the curriculum or in a situation where it might be
perceived as having the endorsement of the school? If not, the case will be
resolved based on the Tinker test. If so, did school policy, either explicitly
or implicitly by longstanding practice, indicate that the school-sponsored
publication or event is a designated public forum? If the answer is yes, the
Tinker doctrine again applies. "[I]f the school publication has been main-
tained as a non-public forum, then the doctrine announced in Hazelwood
applies.8 9 If the censorship had "no valid educational purpose," the First
Amendment rights of students have been violated.90
Whether the free speech activity constitutes a designated public forum
for a school-sponsored curricular activity has been controversial. A school
in Florida invited students to paint murals on plywood separating hallways
for a construction project.91 Some students elected to paint religious-
themed pictures that administrators requested be painted over as they pur-
ported the pictures violated the Establishment Clause.92 The students
charged the administration was violating the Free Exercise Clause. 93 A
major tenet the court was forced to address was whether the activity was
curricular. 94 Because a faculty supervisor was present and the essence of
the project was to promote appreciation for art and school spirit, the court
in fact concluded that the activity was curricular. 95 Suppression of the re-
ligious murals was permissible because it was not based on the viewpoint
expressed by the mural but rather on content.96 Referring back to the
Kountze cheerleaders, the plaintiffs attempt in their complaint to posture
that the supervision provided by the adults, who were faculty "sponsors,"
was completed in a perfunctory manner. Even though these sponsors were
86. Id. (quoting Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685).
87. Id. at 267 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47
(1983)).
88. Id.
89. MICHAEL IMBER & TYLL VAN GEEL, EDUCATION LAW 136 (4th ed. 2010).
90. Id.
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mothers of the cheerleaders, the fact that they are faculty cannot be dis-
missed. Secondly, in Bannon v. School District of Palm Beach Company,
the court determined that the primary impetus for the activity was art and
school spirit. A correlation can be ascertained connecting the cheer-
leaders' run-through banners, designed to promote school spirit, with the
Bannon decision. The cheerleaders, bearing the imprimatur of the school
and developing artwork intended to increase school spirit, are undoubtedly
making themselves representatives of the school at a school-wide event in
which the school has not established a limited public forum.
VI. TANGIBLE SECTARIAN OBJECTS - Do RELIGIOUS ICONS
Go Too FAR?
By the nature of placing religious messages on run-through banners,
the cheerleaders display an object at a public school event to disseminate
their missive. Excluding secular purposes, such as comparative study or
cultural examinations, public schools must refrain from engaging in pro-
moting religion through the display of symbols, icons, and messages. "Pub-
lic schools may not display religious exhibits or other visual materials." 97
Displaying any type of religious picture or message could give the percep-
tion that the school is endorsing or establishing a certain type of religion.
A school district and municipality in New Mexico used a logo, which con-
sisted of three interlocking crosses surrounded by a sun.98 The symbol was
placed on various murals, paintings, and school vehicles.99 Residents of the
district brought separate federal challenges against the city and school dis-
trict citing they were public entities that engaged in proselytizing to their
respective constituents. 00 The court held that the district did not intend to
use the logo in any sectarian means. 01 The image was part of the city's
history and was not intended to endorse Christianity. °2 Though, in con-
trast, if secular intentions are not easily discerned, there is a strong chance
courts will find a violation.
Various religious icons have been somewhat simple for the courts to
declare a violation of state organs endorsing religion. A nativity scene
placed on public school property is an indisputable example of a public
school crossing the boundary between church and state, thus violating the
Establishment Clause. 10 3 In spite of an outlier case in Texas, courts have
been consistent regarding the exclusion of the Ten Commandments from
public entities. 10 4 The Supreme Court held in McCreary County Kentucky
v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky that framed copies of the
97. NATHAN L. ESSEX, SCHOOL LAW AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 27 (5th ed. 2012).





103. ESSEX, supra note 97, at 27.
104. Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 182 (2005).
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Ten Commandments on two Kentucky courthouses amounted to an accom-
modation of Christianity and a violation of church and state separation. 0 5
Juxtaposing McCreary with Van Orden v. Perry illustrates the complexity
and sensitivity associated with the issue of displays on public property, es-
pecially school grounds.1 °6
The complaint the cheerleaders filed against the school deviated from
the paradigm previously described.'07 The plaintiffs relied upon the notion
that all of the materials used to produce the run-through banners were pur-
chased with private funds, thus bisecting the speech act from the school
endorsing the exhibit by amplifying school funds were not associated with
the speech on the banners.'0 8 If school monies had been directly attributa-
ble to the cheerleaders, it would be easily determined that the school was
providing support for religious activities, which would be a luculent viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause. Establishing that school funds were not
being used for purchasing materials to construct the banners was a crucial
component for the plaintiffs' argument. However, the theory espoused in
the complaint maintains very little weight. The Supreme Court disallowed
a Kentucky statute that required all public schools to post the Ten Com-
mandments, and the display copies were paid for with private funds." 9 The
Kountze cheerleaders are on tenuous ground with the sign. As a religious
object, the sign is impermissible. The fact that private donations sponsored
the religious icons on public grounds is irrelevant.
VII. GOVERNMENTAL COERCION - THE TEST FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
As cases involving Establishment Clause questions matriculated
through the American Court system, the Supreme Court, in adjudicating
these cases formulated three tests designed to assess the coercive effect
governmental policies have on establishing state-sponsored religion. The
105. McCreary Cnty. Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 354 F.3d. 438, 461-62 (2005).
106. Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 182 (The Court held that a monument erected in 1962, which con-
tained the Ten Commandments served a less blatant purpose, serving more historical and educational
purposes. The statue was located among other secular items on Capitol grounds; those who opposed the
monument contended that the first four or five commandments referenced solely Judeo-Christian relig-
ion, which was offensive to non-Judeo-Christians. Justice Breyer noted in the majority opinion that the
statue in Texas had been standing for over forty years, whereas the Ten Commandments posted in
Kentucky drew the ire of citizens as soon as they were posted.); Contra Washegesic v. Blpomingdale
Pub. Sch., 33 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 1994) (A portrait titled Head of Christ painted by Warner Sallman was
solely hung at a conspicuous intersection in a high school hallway for thirty years and was held to be in
violation of the Establishment Clause, thus requiring its removal.).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (insisting that the statute in question serves a secu-
lar legislative purpose, the Court found that the display had no educational function but that the pre-
eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly religious in nature;
the Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths and no legisla-
tive recitation of a supposed secular purpose can bind us to that fact).
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Lemon test11° was contrived from a case in 1971 that established a tri-par-
tite examination to assess Establishment Clause claims. The three-part test
stated that governmental action must: 1) Have a secular purpose; 2) have a
primary effect that neither advances nor impedes religion; and 3) avoid
"excessive ... entanglement with religion."' Since this case, the Lemon
test has been used with consistency, yet some Justices appear to be growing
in their dissatisfaction with its separationist tenets.
' 12
Some Supreme Court Justices are more inclined to employ an en-
dorsement standard, which strikes down governmental action if an objec-
tive observer views an act as having the purpose or effect of endorsing or
disapproving of religion. Lastly, the Court has relied upon the coercion
test, which bases an Establishment Clause violation on whether there is
direct or indirect governmental coercion on individuals to profess a faith.'13
As Establishment Clause contests continue to arise, American jurispru-
dence will rely on various coercion lenses to determine the extent of the
violation.
VIII. RELIGIOUS MESSAGES AT EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES:
CONFLICT AT THE CIRCUIT COURTS
While multiple components to the Kountze contest have been ad-
dressed in this thesis contrary to the district court's decision, the actual act
of a proven school-associated organization (the cheerleaders) utilizing an
extra-curricular venue to amplify their religious message is jurispruden-
tially significant. The plaintiffs attempt to characterize the messages, on
the run-through banners, as permissible because the cheerleaders vote
weekly as to what message will be displayed. Having cheerleaders vote on
the inclusion of religious messages on the banners requires reference to a
plethora of jurisprudence. The first segment to address is students voting
for various religious messages to be stated or displayed at extra-curricular
activities. As with the Kountze cheerleaders, they voted to determine what
message would be placed on the banners." 4 To amplify this notion, the
election was done solely with the cheerleaders and not the entire student
population.
15
In Lee, the Court held that it was unconstitutional for a district in
Rhode Island to have a policy, which allowed a principal to invite clergy
members to give a non-sectarian invocation or benediction at middle and
110. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
111. Id. at 612-13.
112. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993) (compar-
ing the Lemon standard to a "'ghoul" that rises from the dead "after being repeatedly killed and bur-
ied") (Scalia, J., concurring).
113. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
114. Order on Plaintiff's Application for Temporary Injunction at 4-22, Matthews v. Kountze In-
dep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526 (Dist. Ct. Tex. Oct. 18, 2012).
115. Id.
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high school graduation ceremonies.116 The Court concluded that a princi-
pal's invitation to a rabbi to present a non-sectarian prayer at a high school
graduation violated the Establishment Clause.'
17
The Court majority reasoned that the policy had a coercive effect: stu-
dents felt peer-pressure to participate in the devotionals that were con-
ducted at the school-sponsored graduation ceremony. The Court was not
persuaded that the voluntary nature of graduation exercises eliminated the
constitutional infraction; students should not have to make a choice be-
tween attending their graduation ceremony and respecting their religious
convictions.
1 8
The cheerleaders established a coercive environment on two facets.
First, the banners with the religious messages are created for the football
team to run through as they enter the playing area. A football player or
cheerleader that does not endorse the Judeo-Christian religion may feel
compelled to participate in this action, forcing the athlete to set aside his or
her religious beliefs to participate in the activity. Certainly those that did
not vote for the action are having their minority viewpoint suppressed.
Secondly, the banners are displayed at a football game, which entices all
students and community members to attend. As stated earlier, football
games are a quintessential part of American high school norms and com-
munity culture. The posting of such religious messages may cause great
discomfort for those participating or attending the game, in that some indi-
viduals may opt not to participate because he or she does not espouse the
messages on the banner. In essence, the student body member, whether an
athlete or not, is forced to make a decision between his or her religion and
participating. Those who purport that religious moments are appropriate
to be included at school events have attempted circuitous maneuvers by
initiating the activity through an election of the student population.
A circuit split exists over how to address this issue. Some federal
courts, like the Fifth Circuit, seemed willing to accept this postulate when it
t held that a student-led, non-sectarian graduation prayer, delivered by stu-
dents, did not violate the Establishment Clause." 9 Additionally, the Elev-
enth Circuit Court in Alabama, addressed the issue of a statute that was
challenged permitting nonsectarian, non-proselytizing, student-initiated
116. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 577.
117. Id.
118. MARTHA M. MCCARTHY, NELDA H. CAMBRON-MCCABE & SUZANNE E. ECKES, PUBLIC
SCHOOL LAW: TEACHERS' AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS 31 (2004).
119. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), vacated and re-
manded, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992), on remand, 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming a district court opin-
ion declaring that a school district's policy permitting graduating seniors to elect student volunteers to
deliver nonsectarian, non-proselytizing invocations at graduation ceremonies did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause); see also Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d. 832 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated on
procedural grounds, 177 F.3d. 789 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding constitutional before being vacated for moot-
ness, that a school district policy that allowed the invitation of at least four students to offer an address,
reading, song, prayer, musical presentation, poem, or any other pronouncement consisting of the stu-
dents' choice of content).
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prayer, invocations and benedictions at compulsory and non-compulsory
school-related activities. 120 The issue was summarized thusly:
Do school officials have the ability (and duty) to impose content re-
strictions on purportedly "private speakers at school events," in order to
achieve neutrality with respect to religion as the Chandlers contend, or do
the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses require that school officials per-
mit student religious speech at the same time, and in the same place and
manner as secular speech, as De Kalb contends? Under the Chandlers' the-
ory, student religious speech is attributable to the State thereby violating
the constitutional requirement of neutrality. Students, therefore, cannot be
permitted to speak freely in school if religion is the topic; the State has a
positive duty to censor student speech if it is religious. 2'
The court held that permitting students to speak religiously did not
constitute state approval or disapproval; therefore, the students' speech
was not state- sponsored.' 22 The court pontificated that there must be neu-
trality toward religious speech.12 3 And tolerating students' religious ex-
pression meets that expectation. Once the court determined the religious
speech qualified as protected private speech, it analyzed the case based
upon the Free Speech Clause. 124 The court found suppression of private
religious speech to be "the most egregious form of content-based censor-
ship" viewpoint discrimination. 25 In contrast, the court amplified that a
student's religious speech is not absolute. 126 The time, place, and manner
that regulates secular speech is applicable. 127 When the state endorses or
participates in the student-initiated speech, the speech becomes unconstitu-
tional. 128 The Chandler decision posits that genuine, student-initiated relig-
ious speech must not be prohibited and the restrictions of time, place, and
manner could not exceed non-religious speech.
29
In contrast, several circuit courts concluded that student-led prayer
withstood scrutiny and were found to be unconstitutional. The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that a school policy, allowing a student vote to decide whether or
not to have a religious prayer at commencement, unconstitutional. 130 The
court determined that the school had extensive involvement in the pol-
icy.' The school retained a large amount of control over the ceremony,
120. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1260 (11th Cir. 1999).
121. Id. at 1260.
122. Id.
123. Id.





129. Id at 1266.
130. Harris v. Joint Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, judgment
vacated by, 515 U.S. 1154 (1994).
131. Id.
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such as financial support, content of the program, and direction of the stu-
dents. 32 The court specified that the State could not absolve itself of its
constitutional obligation by delegating its responsibilities to a private
party.133 Irrespective of the fact that a disclaimer appeared in the gradua-
tion program, this act made no difference to the court. 34 Students were
still aware the school was influencing the commencement exercises. 135 In
addition, the court maintained that the school did not create an open forum
because its policy silenced minority views by a majority vote. 3 6
To draw these conclusions, the Harris v. Joint Independent School Dis-
trict court employed the coercion test described in Lee to declare the pol-
icy unconstitutional.'37 The court found the case indistinguishable from
Lee, in that students were obligated to attend the ceremony and participate
in the prayer. 138 The court also concluded that there was no secular pur-
pose for the prayer and would fail the Lemon test's primary effect
clause. 3 9 If a prayer of this nature were to be delivered at a church, its
primary effect would be to advance religion. 40 Therefore, the effect of the
prayer is indistinguishable between the church and school; the intent was to
disseminate a religious message to the audience.' 4 ' The Ninth Circuit
therefore concluded that the prayer violated the Establishment Clause. 42
Importantly for the Kountze case, the court concluded that the prayer
would be in violation of the Free Exercise Clause because the graduation
ceremony did not qualify as an open or public forum. 4 3 The court de-
murred the Free Exercise claim by the high school, "[T]hese high school
students are free to worship together as they please before and after the
school day... and outside of the graduation ceremony. Moreover, by en-
tering the public sphere and planning a state-controlled, state-sponsored
meeting, the students entered the domain of the Establishment Clause."' 44
The ambiguity raised regarding the creation of limited public fora was
strongly addressed in this case by the declaration that a school still main-
tained a significant amount of state authority in graduation ceremonies.' 45
The Fifth Circuit addressed a challenge to a Mississippi statue, which
allowed nonsectarian and non-proselytizing prayer at compulsory and non-
132. Id.
133. Id. at 455.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 455-56.
136. Id. at 456-57.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 457.





144. Id. (quoting Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981)).
145. Id.
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compulsory school events. 146 Even though the statute had yet to be imple-
mented, the court held the plaintiff did have standing to bring suit.1 4 7 The
legislation intended to "accommodate the free exercise of religious rights
of its student citizens in the public schools." 48 The court concluded, "[t]his
statement of purpose cannot be characterized as 'secular' because its clear
intent is to inform students, teachers, and school administrators that they
can pray at any school event so long as a student 'initiates' the prayer.'
'1 49
The court also found the district liable for excessive entanglement because
school officials were permitted to lead students in prayer, and were permit-
ted to discipline students who did not wish to participate. 5 ° In addition,
the court also found the statute violated the coercion test because any per-
son including clergy, teachers, and administrators, at compulsory events
could lead prayers.1 5 ' The court was very precise in declaring that this type
of statute demonstrated favoritism and preferential treatment to religious
indoctrination. 1
52
In ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education,'53 the
Third Circuit analyzed a case where a high school that had a tradition of
allowing clergy members to deliver a nonsectarian prayer at graduation if
the senior class voted in favor of it. Local ministers rotated opportunities,
in accordance with the school district's policy, to permit different denomi-
nations the opportunity to speak. 54 The school district sought to comply
with the decision in Lee by reinforcing that no school member could en-
dorse, organize, or promote prayer in any manner. The decision to allow a
prayer at graduation was to be determined by the senior class.' 55 And a
student volunteer could only lead the prayer.
156
The court found the policy unconstitutional on multiple points. 57 It
referenced the free speech rights of students, and it highlighted that the
graduation ceremony did not amount to a public forum.' 58 The school's
administration retained significant control over the ceremony when it did
not permit a speaker from the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU")
to speak about safe sex and condom distribution, who was requested by a
student. 59 The school district was also to be found in violation of Lee be-
cause allowing students an election did not erase state involvement. 60 The
court reasoned that students, in the minority, who did not vote in favor of







153. ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1475-87 (3d Cir. 1996).
154. Id. at 1475.
155. Id.





MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
the prayer, are being coerced to attend the ceremony. 161 The court con-
cluded, "the Board cannot sanction coerced participation in a religious ob-
servance merely by disclaiming responsibility for the content of the
ceremony."1
62
The school district argued that the intent was secular to promote free
speech and to solemnize the event. 163 The court rejected that argument
under the Lemon Test because the graduation ceremony was not viewed as
a public forum, thus, the free speech argument was quickly dismissed.
164
The court also dismissed the school district's assertion that its policy was
intended to satisfy a solemn event with a secular observance.165 In the
court's view, all graduation ceremonies are a solemn event and do not re-
quire sectarian involvement.' 66 The court opined that leaving the choice of
prayer to student vote "would certainly leave the reasonable non-adherent
with the impression that his or her religious choices were disfavored.'
' 67
IX. THE SUPREME COURT PROVIDES GUIDANCE: SANTA FE
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
Due to the ambiguity of the lower federal courts rulings regarding stu-
dent-elected religious messages, the Supreme Court took up the issue of
student-elected religious observances to solemnize important events. The
facts and findings in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe strongly
support the thesis that the Kountze cheerleaders have misapplied the Free
Exercise Clause, whereby, forcing the district into violating the Establish-
ment Clause.' 68 In Santa Fe, a school district in Texas that was located in a
heavily conservative Baptist community enacted a policy permitting a high
school student, elected by the student body, to provide an invocation dur-
ing pregame ceremonies at the school's home varsity football games.169 In
1995, two sets of current or former students-a Catholic and a Morman-
brought suit against the school district alleging 1) the school district main-
tained various policies and practices that violated the Establishment
Clause, and 2) the school district adopted a policy in August of that year
titled "Prayer at Football Games."17° The policy authorized two elec-
tions.' The first determined whether invocation should be delivered at
football games, and the second determined the spokesperson to deliver the
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any requirement that the content of the invocation be nonsectarian and
non-proselytizing. 174 The second portion termed that the "fallback" provi-
sion automatically added that limitation if the first selection were enjoined
by the court. 75
In October 1995, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas ordered the school district to modify the policy to permit
only non-sectarian and non-proselytizing prayer.176 The school promptly
implemented the "fallback" provision, and it slightly adjusted the title of
the policy from "prayer" to "invocation and/or message.' 1 77 The court of
appeals correctly concluded the policy as invalid.t 78 Subsequently, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari.
179
The Supreme Court, in a rather "no-nonsense posture," held that a
"carefully contrived procedure whereby a student elected as the high
school student council chaplain would deliver a prayer over the public ad-
dress system at football games was a veiled attempt to advance the relig-
ious beliefs of a heavily conservative Baptist community that controlled the
school board policy.' 80 The Court determined that one question seemed
to amplify the contention in this case: Does the petitioner's policy permit-
ting student-led, student-initiated prayer, at football games, violate the Es-
tablishment Clause?' 8' Relying on Lee, the Court found similarities in that
the prayer is authorized by a government policy on government property at
a government-sponsored, school-related event. It is evident that the Santa
Fe school officials do not, by policy or practice, intend to open the pregame
ceremony to indiscriminate use. In fact, the policy allows only one student
to give the prayer for the entire season. 182 In actuality, the invocation is
subject to school regulations that confine the content and topic of the stu-
dent's message. 83
Electing one student to deliver a message that the district deems ap-
propriate guarantees that a minority viewpoint will be suppressed. The
Court held the issue of school districts establishing policy to permit only
non-sectarian, non-proselytizing prayers invalid.' 84 The Court rejected the
philosophy of minimizing the intrusion on the audience because it opined
that a majoritarian policy "does not lessen the offense or isolation to objec-
tors.185 At best it narrows their number, at worst increases their sense of
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represented, but it does nothing to protect the minority, and likely intensi-
fies their offense.
The school's policy permitting the student election is an attempt to
divorce itself from the religious content, but by its own nature, it has failed
to accomplish this necessary act. The reality is that the district's policy does
the opposite of its claim of neutrality; it endorses specific acts and content.
The degree of state involvement is high and "the imprint of the State...
puts school-age children who objected in an untenable position[.]" '187 The
District claimed that its premise was to solemnize the event, establish good
sportsmanship and to establish the environment for competition.188 This
language is thinly-veiled as students clearly recognized that the election
was being conducted to determine whether prayer should be part of the
pre-game ceremony. Members of the listening audience must perceive the
message as a public expression of the viewpoint of the majority.
The fact the cheerleaders voted with "no influence" from adult super-
vision, attempts to define this election as strictly led by students. Facially,
the plaintiff voting in the Kountze situation holds many challenges. First,
the adult sponsors claim to have a custodial role no different than that of
''parent to child." The plaintiffs seek to have a reasonable person accept
the fact that these individuals serve no purpose other than to prevent inju-
ries and mediate juvenile disagreements. This thesis is farcical in that no
philosophical or religious persuasion is provided between sponsors and ath-
letes. The plaintiffs are dangerously close to encroaching upon the prohibi-
tion of coaches leading their teams in prayer before an athletic contest, in
addition to school officials engaging in supervision over student-led
elections.1 89
The District argues in the context of Lee that prayer at commence-
ment ceremonies is "dramatically different" from attendance at high school
football games. The school contends that football games are "no more
than a passing interest to many students" and are "decidedly extra-curricu-
lar." 19° The concept of
"extra-curricular is designed to diminish coercion to attend
these games. However, there are some students whose at-
tendance is mandated, such as players, cheerleaders, and
band members. Some students have class credit dependent
upon their attendance. The District minimizes the impor-
tance to many students of attending the games as a com-
plete educational experience."1 91
187. Id. at 304.
188. Id.
189. Jager v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Doe v. Duncanville
Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995) (enjoining district employees and agents from participating
in or supervising student-initiated prayers).
190. Duncanville, 530 U.S. at 309-10.
191. Id.
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To assert that high school students do not feel immense social pressure or
have a truly genuine desire, to be involved in the extra-curricular event that
is American high school football is "formalistic in the extreme."
X. CONCLUSION - CHRISTIAN NATIONALISTS ASSERT THEIR
PHILOSOPHY IN COURT
The Kountze High School cheerleaders by nature of their request have
reinforced the notion that courts are creations of human development with
various lenses being applied by justices who subscribe to an activist theory
in their rulings. The plaintiffs in Kountze base their argument, for posting
religious messages on their run-through banners, on divorcing their associ-
ation from the school auspice and establishing limited public forum for free
speech by employing a team vote. Both the plaintiffs contend, and the
court agrees, that this process does not violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment.192 As this thesis has demonstrated, the argument
proffered by the plaintiffs misapplies or ignores prior case law, yet is sup-
ported by the district court.' 93
In light of this overreach with precise and detailed case law in opposi-
tion to the ruling, the query that remains is, "How the court arrived at its
conclusion supporting the cheerleaders?" The answer is actually predicated
on a religious and political philosophy that is emanating from conservative
cabals. These factions strongly believe that religion, especially a conserva-
tive Christianity, must be disseminated in the venue of public schools.
Katherine Stewart has termed these groups as "Christian Nationalists.' 19 4
The Christian Nationalist ideal can be summarized from Jerry Falwell's
statement, "I hope to see the day when, as in the early days of our country,
we don't have public schools ... The churches will have taken them over
again and Christians will be running them." '95 These activists see the de-
cline as beneficial to their mission. If they cannot break down the doors to
the schools, then they will be quite content to break the schools. 196
The Supreme Court has made major decisions in the post-World War
II era that defined the role of religion in public schools. In essence, juris-
prudentially, a philosophy was eventuated that encouraged the separation
of religion and public schools. Individual rights to practice his or her relig-
ion were maintained and even enhanced, but the courts, collectively, chil-
led public schools' ability to impart religious doctrine on their students.
The Supreme Court, is a political organ, and thus oscillates with the politi-
cal climate of those that select and confirm them. Even though justice is to
192. Order on Plaintiff's Application for Temporary Injunction at 4-22, Matthews v. Kountze In-
dep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526 (Dist. Ct. Tex. Oct. 18, 2012).
193. Id.
194. KATHERINE STEWART, THE GOOD NEWS CLUB: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT'S STEALTH ASSAULT
ON AMERICA'S CHILDREN 3 (2012).
195. JERRY FALWELL, AMERICA CAN BE SAVED 52-53 (1979).
196. STEWART, supra note 194, at 5.
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remain blind, justices often reflect upon their own convictions as the appro-
priate lens to employ in order to resolve a conflict.
Circa 2000, a paradigm shift began to occur on the Supreme Court
with Justices Scalia and Thomas on the conservative end of the political
spectrum pontificating a philosophy that purported the founders of the Na-
tion never intended to separate church and state.197 This position obvi-
ously supports a contention that encourages entanglement, which would
ultimately destroy the positive consensus that kept religion and schools
separate. 198 Justice Scalia contends the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause "appl[y] only to the words and acts of government. It was
never meant and has never been read by the court to serve as an impedi-
ment to purely private religious speech."'1 99 Conservative Justices are ana-
lyzing Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause contentions from
the viewpoint of free speech doctrine. In essence, they are advocating that
religious activity is really just speech from a religious viewpoint and any
attempt to exclude religious activity is an infringement on the freedom of
speech.200 Religion, therefore, is in essence a viewpoint that is a kind of
speech protected by the First Amendment. 20 ' The current conservative
contingent has formulated the axiom that protecting the Establishment
Clause maintaining secular public schools has, by de facto, created a relig-
ion of secularism and needs to be addressed accordingly.20 2 Employing the
doctrine of free speech from the First Amendment is paving the way for a
rejection of the very idea that schools need to remain secular.20 3 If the free
speech argument for religious activities is accurate, then it seems that the
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
are at best redundant, and at worst, meaningless. It is hard to conjure the
notion that the framers would be that inept.
197. Id. at 3.
198. Id. at 80.
199. JEFFERY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 114
(2007).
200. STEWART, supra note 194, at 90.
201. Id. at 91.
202. Id. at 93.
203. Id. at 95.
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